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Response Pacing and Synchronization

Problems can arise when the multiple parties involved in CVD function at different operational tempos. Different organizations have different priorities and development schedules, which can lead to some parties wanting to move faster than others.

In both the vertical and horizontal supply chain cases discussed in Multiparty CVD, synchronized timing of disclosure to the public can be difficult to coordinate. The originating vendor(s) will usually want to release a patch announcement to the public as soon as it is ready. This can, however, put users of downstream products at increased risk. As a result, coordinators sometimes find it necessary to make the difficult choice to withhold notification from a vendor in a complicated multiparty disclosure case if that vendor cannot be trusted to cooperate with the coordination effort.

When One Party Wants to Release Early

In a multiparty coordination scenario, some vendors may want to release early to protect their customers. They have a good point: should Vendor A's customers be kept vulnerable just because Vendor B is taking longer to prepare its response? Yet an equally strong counterargument can be made: should customers of Vendor B be exposed to additional risk because Vendor A was faster at its vulnerability response process?

stateDiagram-v2
    direction LR
notify: Notify<br/>Vendors
State2: Vendor A<br/>Fix Development
State5: Vendor A<br/>Ready
State3: Vendor B<br/>Fix Development
State6: Vendor B<br/>Ready
State4: Public<br/>Disclosure
state fork_state <<fork>>
[*] --> notify
notify --> fork_state
fork_state --> State2
fork_state --> State3
State2 --> State5
State3 --> State6
state join_state <<join>>
State5 --> join_state
State6 --> join_state
join_state --> State4
State4 --> [*]

There is no single right answer to this dilemma. The best you can do is keep the communication channels open and try to reduce the amount of surprise among participants. Planning for contingencies can be a useful exercise too—the focus of such a contingency should be how to respond if information about the vulnerability got out before you were ready for it.

Motivating Cooperation Across Cases

CVD process discussions tend to focus on the handling of individual vulnerability cases rather than the social fabric surrounding vulnerability coordination we construct over time. Shifting away from the individual units of work to the social structure can suggest a way out of some of the more contentious points in any given case.

Axelrod's Principles on the Evolution of Cooperation

Robert Axelrod's book The Evolution of Cooperation is a classic text on the topic. Axelrod's work showed that the most successful strategies in repeated games follow certain principles, which we include here for reference:

  • Don’t be envious
  • Don’t be the first to defect
  • Reciprocate both cooperation and defection
  • Don’t be too clever

We previously described the multiparty delay problem. Game theory provides us with the prisoners' dilemma as model for thinking about this concern. The main takeaway from research into the prisoners' dilemma is that by shifting one's perspective to considering a repeated game, it's possible to find better solutions than would be possible in a one-shot game with no history. The recognition that it's a repeated game leads to improved cooperation among players who would otherwise be motivated to act solely in their own self-interest in each round.

One approach we've found to work is to remind the parties involved that this will likely not be the last multiparty vulnerability coordination effort in which they find themselves. A vendor that repeatedly releases early will likely get left out of future coordination efforts. Because of this, the quicker vendors might be motivated to delay so they get the vulnerability information the next time.

The Repeated Game

Perhaps most important for those wanting to release early is to remember that this is a repeated game; you might be first one ready to publish this time but that may not always be the case. Consideration for the other parties involved in any given case can yield better outcomes in the long run.

In the end, everyone benefits from vendors improving their vulnerability response processes, so helping the laggards become more efficient can sometimes become a secondary goal of the coordination process.

Reporting a Vulnerability to CERT/CC

You can request the CERT/CC's assistance in coordinating a vulnerability disclosure process by submitting a report through the CERT/CC's Vulnerability Reporting Form (VRF).