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Explanation

CSAF 2.1 and Vultron

This page is not normative

This page is not considered a core part of the Vultron Protocol as proposed in the main documentation. Although within the page we might provide guidance in terms of SHOULD, MUST, etc., the content here is not normative.

This page explains how the Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) 2.1 draft and the Vultron Protocol relate to each other. It is for readers who know one of the two models and want to know how the other one fits with it. These readers include members of the CSAF Technical Committee (TC) of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). It describes three relations between a CSAF document and a Vultron case, and it gives a summary of each area where the two models meet. Three other pages give the detail: the concept mapping, the coverage differences, and the proposals. The conclusions page gives the result and the follow-up work.

CSAF version in this crosswalk

This crosswalk compares Vultron with one revision of the Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) 2.1 draft. The revision is Committee Specification Draft 04 (CSD04), dated 21 October 2026. The source text is commit 29b1e27 of the oasis-tcs/csaf repository. At that commit, the full draft text is csaf_2.1/prose/share/csaf-v2.1-draft.md, and the schema is csaf_2.1/json_schema/csaf.json. CSAF 2.1 is a draft, and the CSAF Technical Committee (TC) of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) can change it before it becomes a standard. Statements about CSAF on this page apply to that revision only.


Why this comparison exists

CSAF is a machine-readable format for security advisories, published by OASIS. CSAF 2.0 recorded the parties in a disclosure with a short involvements list on each vulnerability. CSAF 2.1 replaces that list with one document.involvement object: a list of entities, optional entity groups, and a timeline of actions between the entities.

The TC started this change from Vultron. The issue that opened the work, oasis-tcs/csaf#1486, says: "As a starting point, we can use Vultron". The TC meeting of 29 July 2026 recorded the approach: study the Vultron project and its states, then design the involvement model from the start. Because the TC used Vultron as an input, many concepts on the two sides are close, and a crosswalk can show where they agree and where they do not.


Different levels of abstraction

CSAF and Vultron work at different levels of abstraction. CSAF records what happened in a disclosure. Vultron controls how a disclosure proceeds.

A design proposal for the CSAF 2.1 involvement model, by a TC member, states this difference itself. Its informative appendix "Comparison with Vultron" (comment on #1486, 14 August 2026) says:

The CSAF involvement model has a different purpose. It is a documentation model: it records interactions that were observed to occur, so that a reader of an advisory can reconstruct who coordinated with whom about what.

A later comment by the same author (25 August 2026) adds that the purpose of involvement "is not to describe all involvements, but to allow a publishing party to describe selected involvements they consider relevant for their audience."

Vultron has the other purpose. Its state machines for Report Management (RM), Embargo Management (EM), and Case State (CS) state which changes are permitted and who can make them. Its case ledger records every change to the case, not a selection. Neither purpose is better than the other. The difference explains most of the gaps on the other pages, and it tells which gaps to keep.


How a CSAF document relates to a Vultron case

A CSAF document can relate to a Vultron case in three ways:

Relation In Vultron
A CSAF document replaces the case Not used.
A CSAF document travels inside the case Partly built. A report carries a CSAF document as an attachment, and the receiver records whether the document passes the CSAF 2.1 schema and what it claims. When the report is first offered, the receiver can fill the inputs of the new case from it, and a CSAF document that arrives later changes no case data.
The case produces a CSAF document Planned.

A CSAF document does not replace the case

A CSAF document is not the case of record in Vultron. The reasons come from the CSAF design.

CSAF property Consequence for a case of record
The action status has no state machine. The design proposal calls it "descriptive and observational", and the draft gives only an informative common order for a notification. CSAF cannot hold the rules that decide which change is permitted.
The involvement timeline holds selected events. A case of record holds all events.
One issuing party publishes each document. A case has many participants, and each one writes to it through the CASE_MANAGER.
Entity identifiers, action identifiers, and the dl_vuln_id of a vulnerability are local to one document. A case needs identifiers that stay the same in all messages.
CSAF has no rule to merge documents from different issuing parties. A case combines the contributions of all participants.
Only the issuing party revises a CSAF document. A different party that changes it issues a new document (CSAF Modifier). A case has shared authority to change it, which Vultron gives to the Case Owner and the CASE_MANAGER.

For a small case between two parties, an exchange of CSAF documents can be sufficient without Vultron. Vultron becomes necessary when more parties, an embargo, or a disagreement make the rules for change important.

A CSAF document can travel inside a case

A participant can send a CSAF document as an attachment of a Vultron report. The document is a Document in the attachment of the VulnerabilityReport in Offer(VulnerabilityReport), with the media type application/json. The report keeps its own text in content, and it can carry other files beside the CSAF document. The CSAF 2.1 Vulnerability Report profile is made for this use. That profile "SHALL be used to exchange a vulnerability report during the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process", and its Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) label SHOULD be TLP:AMBER.

Some fields of such a document describe the process, for example disclosure_date and the Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) exploitation value. ADR-0184 and the CSAF requirements give four rules for such a document:

  1. The receiver reads the document as the statement of the sender only when it arrives with the first offer of a report, before a case exists for the report, and only when its category is csaf_vulnerability_report.
  2. A value in a Vultron field of the offer or the report counts before the value for the same thing in the CSAF document.
  3. A CSAF document that arrives at any other time changes no case data, because it can be a projection or a draft advisory that describes the case.
  4. The receiver does not refuse a report because of its CSAF document.

For example, a future disclosure_date in the first report becomes the proposed end of the embargo when the offer proposes none. The proposal then goes through the normal embargo process, and the case ledger records the result. Issue #5131 planned these rules, and Epic #5911 tracks their implementation.

A case can produce a CSAF document

A Vultron participant can produce a CSAF document from its copy of the case. This crosswalk calls such a document a projection. ADR-0219 (proposed) decides how a projection is made. A projection can occur at two times:

Time Use
At publication The public record of the vulnerability. The publication pipeline (ADR-0030) defines a draft, review, and submit pipeline for advisory artifacts, and a CSAF document can be one output of its draft step.
During coordination A bridge to a vendor, a national Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), or a reporting authority that does not use Vultron.

A projection takes case information out of the protocol. For this reason, a projection must not include information that the recipient is not entitled to see. The place that makes the projection selects a fixed profile, and the profile cuts the case into a preview before a CSAF renderer reads it. Each projection also states the ledger position that it shows, because the case continues to change after the projection. The involvement timeline of a projection is a filtered view of the case ledger. That agrees with the CSAF design, in which the issuing party selects the events that its audience needs. The case holds no product data, so each projection is a CSAF Base document (csaf_base), not a Security Advisory, a VEX document, or a Vulnerability Report. Issue #5134 planned these rules.


TLP marks a projection, not a case

Vultron has no TLP labels. It controls who sees what through the participants that are entitled to the case and through the embargo. This crosswalk takes the position that TLP becomes necessary only when information goes out of Vultron, which occurs in a projection. Concern #5133 tracks that position, and Idea #2564 asks whether Vultron messages could carry TLP fields.

For this reason, a TLP label belongs to one projection. ADR-0219 fixes the label by the profile of the projection: TLP:CLEAR for the public profile at publication, and TLP:AMBER+STRICT for the profile of a projection during coordination. Different recipients can receive different projections of the same case at the same time.

TLP label Fit for a projection
TLP:AMBER+STRICT The usual fit before public disclosure. The recipient can share only inside its own organization.
TLP:AMBER Fits only when the recipient can also share with its clients on a need-to-know basis. That sharing occurs outside the case, so Vultron cannot record it. One Vultron way to add a party is the suggest-actor-to-case flow. The CSAF Vulnerability Report profile recommends TLP:AMBER "to promote sharing on a need-to-know basis within the vendor's or coordinator's organization and, where appropriate, their clients". The default label of CSAF is CLEAR.
TLP:RED Fits only an observer. A TLP:RED recipient cannot tell its own team to act on the information.
TLP:CLEAR Fits a projection with the content of a public advisory, after the vulnerability is known to be public.

A projection can be TLP:CLEAR because it selects its content. The full case history, with each message between participants and its time, can stay restricted after the advisory is public. A more detailed projection of the same case can need a stricter label at the same time.

Terminology for TLP and public status

A TLP label applies to a document, not to a case. The correct statement is "this document, which describes information derived from the case, is TLP:CLEAR". The statement "the case is TLP:CLEAR" is not correct.

In the same way, public status applies to the vulnerability, not to the case. The correct statement is "the vulnerability described in the case is known to be public". This agrees with the Public Awareness (P) dimension of the CS model.

When a received CSAF document has a label that is stricter than the Vultron entitlement rules, Vultron cannot enforce that label. For example, a TLP:RED document can arrive in a case with five participants. Only the policy of the receiving participant can obey the label. This is a known limit, and concern #5133 tracks it.


Summary by area

The table gives one row for each area where the two models meet. Similarity is Same (same concept and shape), Close (same concept, different shape), or Divergent (same area, conflicting meaning). Proposed change says what could change, or why nothing changes. The links go to the detailed rows.

Area Similarity Proposed change
Parties and roles Close No change proposed. Both models put finder and reporter into one role with different names. The Reporter role and the CSAF discoverer category are the same choice.
Events and timeline Close No change proposed. A CSAF action has the same shape as an ActivityStreams activity: an actor, recipients, a time, a type, and a referenced earlier event. Undecided: CSAF could let an entity carry an identifier that stays the same in different documents.
Report management Close No change proposed. Vultron state names tell what already occurred, and CSAF status values tell what occurs now. Undecided: CSAF confirmation puts receipt and acceptance into one value.
Embargo Close CSAF could let an embargo action carry its own end date, and CSAF could record the early end of an embargo. See the proposals.
Case state Close No change proposed. Both models keep exploit availability as a fact about the vulnerability, not as an event between parties.
Content objects Close Vultron could add vulnerability records to the case, with CSAF or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) content. Vultron reads the fields of a CSAF document that arrives with the first offer of a report (ADR-0184). See #5132 and #5131.
Distribution and tracking Divergent No change proposed. A projection would derive its own TLP label. The way TLP could appear inside Vultron is an open concern (#5133).

The coverage differences page lists the concepts that only one of the two models has.


Further reading

  • Proposals — the changes that CSAF and Vultron could make, each with its reason and its cost if nothing changes.
  • Conclusions — what the comparison shows, and the issues that track the follow-up work.
  • Concept mapping — each Vultron concept, its CSAF counterpart, and the type of mapping in each direction.
  • Coverage differences — concepts that only one of the two models has.
  • Standards Crosswalks — the other crosswalks of Vultron against related standards.
  • oasis-tcs/csaf#1486 — the TC issue for the CSAF 2.1 involvement model.